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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Trade ﬂows have increased substantially in the last decades. As of 2000, the average country in the world was
selling and buying abroad a value equal to 27% of its gross domestic product. In contrast, labor ﬂows increased
much less. In 2000 only 1.8% of the world population was living in an OECD country diﬀerent from their country
of birth (Freeman 2006). Recent data (Docquier and Marfouk, 2005) and studies (Grogger and Hanson 2008)
have shown that a partial exception to this low labor mobility is the behavior of highly educated workers. Up to
15% of the individuals with tertiary education from some less developed countries reside abroad (usually in an
industrialized country) and this segment has become increasingly more mobile than the rest of the population.
Table 1 reports the emigration rates by educational group for some representative source countries,1 calculated
as the stock of people residing abroad divided by the working-age population in that group in the country of
origin.2 We notice that in 2000 the emigration rates for the highly educated were much larger than for any
other group. Furthermore, they generally grew during the 1990s by more than those of the other groups. For
instance, for Romania, a typical Eastern European economy, and for Eastern Europe as a whole (last two rows
of Table 1) the emigration rates of the highly educated were two to three times larger than the emigration rates
of the less educated. As barriers to labor mobility within the European Union are dismantled,3 the ﬂow of
highly educated workers from the East is expected to increase.
The migration of highly educated workers, often called “brain drain”, has attracted the attention of policy-
makers and economists. Generally, the cost of losing the best educated workers is considered to be high
for the sending countries. At the same time, though, several economists have recognized that from a world
perspective international restrictions on labor mobility are one of the most costly economic distortions.4 This
paper exploits the fact that Western and Eastern Europe are potential testing grounds for the impact of free labor
mobility between regions that have achieved trade integration but still have signiﬁcant diﬀerences in productivity.
We develop a model capable of predicting the patterns and eﬀects of free labor mobility between economies
that trade with each other but have signiﬁcant productivity (technological) diﬀerences and where workers are
heterogeneous in their education (skill) levels. Such a model is novel relative to those combining Heckscher-Ohlin
and monopolistic competition (such as Krugman, 1981) because it also incorporates technological diﬀerences
and heterogeneous agents, which are critical to determine the direction and selection of migrants. On the other
hand it is novel relative to those models that combine Heckscher-Ohlin features and heterogeneous agents (such
1The data are from Docquier and Marfouk (2005) who collected information from Censuses of resident populations in OECD
countries in the year 2000.
2The table distinguishes between less educated (0 to 8 years of schooling), those with intermedi a t ee d u c a t i o n( 9t o1 2y e a r so f
schooling) and the highly educated (13 years of schooling or more)
3The accession treaty that admitted ten new countries to the EU in 2004, and Romania and Bulgaria in 2006, contained
transitional arrangements that allowed the old EU members to postpone the opening of their labour markets for at least two
years and, at most, seven years. A detailed description of the labor market restrictions in place and the provision of transitional
agreements can be found in Boeri and Brucker (2005).
4See, for example, Klein and Ventura (2007), Kremer and Watt (2006) or Benhabib and Jovanovic (2007).
2as Rauch 1991) because it includes monopolistic competition and technological diﬀerences, which are critical to
obtain gains from international migration.
More precisely, we propose a two-country (“West” and “East”), two-sector (“Homogeneous” and “Diﬀeren-
tiated”) model with workers of diﬀerent skill levels and skill-speciﬁc technological diﬀerences across countries.
In particular, the West has higher total factor productivity (TFP), a larger market size and a more skill-
complementary technology conferring to it a comparative advantage in the high-tech sector. The model features
the traditional “comparative advantage” motive for inter-industry trade. However, due to technological dif-
ferences across countries trade does not imply factor price equalization. Thus, even under free trade, lifting
the restrictions on the free movement of workers would induce migratory ﬂows. At the same time, the model
incorporates love for variety and a home market eﬀect in the diﬀerentiated sector, which imply that trade has
a welfare enhancing eﬀect on both countries.
An important feature of the model is that it incorporates agents of diﬀerent skill (schooling) levels and
generates plausible migration patterns. The complementarity between technology and high skills in the diﬀer-
entiated sector, more pronounced in the West, implies that highly educated workers have the greatest incentive
t om i g r a t ef r o mt h eE a s tt ot h eW e s t . T h e s ei n c e n t i v e s are somewhat reduced but not eliminated by trade.
An important and novel result of the paper is that, in the presence of trade, the migration of the highly skilled
workers may be beneﬁcial to both the sending and the receiving country. This is because the Eastern European
migrants are more productive in the West and thus increase the total production of the diﬀerentiated consump-
tion goods at lower prices that Eastern consumers also enjoy via trade. Such trade-mediated “spillovers” of
skilled migrants have not been pointed out in the literature before.5 As we show, the gains can be quantitatively
relevant, especially when trade is large, trade costs are small and productivity diﬀerences are signiﬁcant.
More generally our model, calibrated to Eastern and Western European economies, generates the following
three main predictions:
• First, labor allocation of workers is currently distorted by the presence of large legal barriers to labor
mobility. The estimated current migration costs due to legal barriers are equivalent to 26% of the wage
income that the migrants would receive in Western Europe. If those costs were reduced to half of their
current value, about 9% of the Eastern European population of working age, selected among those with
secondary and some tertiary education, would work in the West. Currently only 1.48% of Eastern-born
workers reside in Western Europe.
• Second, highly educated migrants (with more than a secondary education) would be the group gaining
the most from reduced barriers to mobility. They would earn real wages between 60% and 100% higher
5Recently Broda and Weinstein (2006) have measured the sizeable gains from imported varieties in the US (equal to 2.4% of the
GDP as of 2001).
3than they currently do.
• Third, given the ﬂow of goods and services between the East and the West measured as of 2004, if legal
costs were reduced to half of their current value the gains from increased variety that migrants would
generate would oﬀset the negative “brain drain” eﬀect on East European, and workers left behind in the
East would experience a small real average wage increase of around 0.1%.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. section 2 reviews the existing literature. Section 3 describes the
model and the equilibrium in autarky while section 4 compares the autarky equilibrium with the equilibria in
t h ep r e s e n c eo ft r a d ea n dt h e nw i t ht r a d ea n dm i g r a t i o n . The calibration of the model to the data for Eastern
and Western Europe is detailed in section 5, where the model is also simulated to evaluate the (comparative
static) welfare gains from trade and migration. Section 6 summarizes the main results and concludes.
2 Literature Review
Many of the models that analyze the determinants and the eﬀects of international migration use a simpliﬁed
framework often based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model or the speciﬁcf a c t o r sm o d e l . 6 In a world where land is
an important factor of production these models still provide some useful insights.7 They can also be helpful if
we simply want to explain overall migration tendencies to capital-abundant (rich) countries from capital-scarce
(poor) countries. However, neither model is particularly well suited to analyze migration and trade together,
mainly because in these models trade and migration are substitutes for one another.8 Moreover, once we
consider highly educated and less educated workers as diﬀerent factors of production, the factor endowment
model wrongly predicts the direction of skilled migration: educated migrants should move from rich (skill
abundant) to poor (skill scarce) countries. Alternatively, international movements of factors (capital and labor)
have also been analyzed in models where countries have diﬀerent total factor productivity (TFP) and those
diﬀerences are the only determinants of factor ﬂows (Lucas 1990, Davis and Weinstein 2002). Yet, surprisingly,
what is missing in the recent international migration literature is any consideration of the features that have
held center-stage in the new trade theories: monopolistic competition (and the gains from trade due to increased
variety) and heterogeneity in the productivity of agents. Our model introduces these two elements into a model
of trade and migration that, consistent with previous models, also features comparative advantage and TFP
diﬀerentials between countries.
6See for instance Chapter 7 of Krugman and Obtsfeld (2006), still the most popular undergraduate textbook on International
Economics, and Chapter 5 of Feenstra (2008). See also Mundell (1957) and Wong (1986).
7Hatton and Williams (2005) and (2006) use factor-endowment models with land and labor to analyze the migration from Europe
to the US in the early 20th century.
8Or also, because there is only one good being produced and thus there is no trade at all.
4Related to our work is Rauch (1991) which reconciles the patterns of migration and trade within a Heckscher-
Ohlin model where skilled workers can work as managers or workers and diﬀer in their managerial abilities.9
In such a framework the skill abundant country has a larger group of managers who increase the productivity
of workers and their wages. Moreover, the ability of the marginal worker who is indiﬀerent between being a
manager or a worker is higher in the skill-abundant country than in the skill-scarce country. Therefore, workers
who have skills in between the thresholds of the two countries have incentives to migrate from the skill-scarce to
the skill-abundant country. Relative to Rauch (1991), our model allows for a richer set-up with intra-industry
trade (driven by economies of scale and love for variety) and productivity diﬀerences across countries. Our
model uncovers a new channel of gains from migration. Due to the increased productivity of migrants in the
receiving country and their contribution to the production of diﬀerentiated goods, the sending country may also
gain from migration by accessing a larger number of varieties at lower prices.10
Our paper also contributes to the sizeable literature on the “brain drain”. This literature has traditionally
emphasized the costs of losing a country’s best educated workers.11 On the other hand, some studies have pointed
out possible beneﬁts derived from the brain drain, such as the productivity opportunities that international
mobility generates for the skilled migrants (Bhagwati and Rodriguez 1975; Bhagwati and Hamada 1974), the
creation of international networks (diaspora) to channel transfers of knowledge and stimulate trade (Rauch and
Trinidade 2002), the possibility of return of skilled workers (Kapur and McHale 2005) and the incentives that
migration might create for human capital formation in the sending countries (Mountford 1997, Stark 2004,
Beine et al 2001). Our model adds to those beneﬁts the possibility of trade-mediated gains from increased
varieties. Finally, of related interest to our work is Klein and Ventura (2006), the only other paper we know
of that quantiﬁes the eﬀects on wages and migration ﬂows of East-West European economic integration. They
use a model with TFP diﬀerences and migration costs to analyze the eﬀects of removing migration restrictions
in Europe.12 In addition to those elements, our model considers trade, skill-speciﬁc technology and worker
heterogeneity, all absent in Klein and Ventura (2006). Moreover, we analyze trade liberalization between
Eastern and Western Europe as an intermediate step between economic autarky and free mobility of workers.
9An early attempt to explain the brain drain to rich countries invoking increasing returns to human capital was Miyagiwa (1991).
10The only study that analyzes, from a theoretical point of view, a mechanism somewhat reminiscent of ours is Kuhn and
McAusland (2006). They develop a model of gains from brain drain based on externalities stemming from the knowledge creation
activity that spills over to the sending country. That paper, however, emphasizes market size diﬀerences rather than productivity
diﬀerences, and knowledge diﬀusion, rather than trade, as the channel for the positive spillover eﬀects.
11For instance, the ”ﬁscal loss” from the ﬂight of high income earners (Bhagwati and Hamada 1974), the negative growth eﬀect
from the loss in human capital (Wong and Yip 1999) and the loss of potential positive human capital externalities in productivity
(Benhabib and Jovanovic 2007).
12Klein and Ventura (2006) develop a fully dynamic model that can analyze the transition process while our static analysis should
be thought of as comparing steady state equilibria.
53 The Model
We develop a two-country, two-sector model building on Iranzo and Peri (2009) which in turn builds on Yeaple
(2005). We begin by presenting the main setup of the model and the equilibrium in the absence of trade
and migration. In this section we also study analytically how specialization, prices and wages are aﬀected by
the market size, the productivity and the educational distribution of the country in autarky. This provides
useful insights in order to understand the eﬀects of trade and migration once we allow (in section 4) for the
international movement of goods and workers.
3.1 Preferences and Demand
Let us consider two economies labelled 1 (West) and 2 (East) whose residents have identical preferences.
Two goods are being consumed in each economy: a homogeneous good Y and a diﬀerentiated good X.13 The
preferences of the representative consumer in country j are described by a Constant Elasticity of Substitution












with θ>1( 1 )













with σ>θ>1,j =1 ,2( 2 )
where x(i) represents the amount of variety i consumed and Nj i st h en u m b e ro fv a r i e t i e so fg o o dX produced
in country j. The parameter σ captures the elasticity of substitution across varieties and is assumed to be larger
than the elasticity of substitution between goods X and Y (θ) so that the diﬀerent varieties of X are closer
substitutes for each other than for good Y . Taking good Y as the numeraire in each country and deﬁning Ej
as the aggregate expenditure in country j, one can derive the total goods demand in country j, XD
j and Y D
j ,
and the demand for each variety of good X, xD


























13Most of the propositions proved below carry through, with more cumbersome algebra and notation, if we also consider Y as a
diﬀerentiated good produced in monopolistic competition. In that case we need the elasticity of substitution across varieties of Y ,
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is the share of expenditure devoted
to good X in country j.
3.2 Production
There is only one factor of production: labor. Workers diﬀer in their skill level which we denote Z ∈ [0,1].
The distribution of workers’ skills in country j is given by the cumulative density function Gj(Z)a n di ne a c h
country j there is a total mass of workers equal to Mj.W e c a l lWj(Z) the wage (in terms of the numeraire)
that a worker of skill Z receives in country j. As labor is the only factor of production, the aggregate labor






We assume that good Y is produced using a constant returns to scale technology. The function AYj(Z)
expresses the amount of good Y produced by a worker of skill Z in country j, that is, the productivity of skill
Z in units of the numeraire. Similarly, AXj(Z) indicates the amount of good X produced by a worker of skill
Z in country j. The technology of sector X is relatively more productive for highly skilled workers than the
technology of sector Y. Also, each country j may have a speciﬁc productivity level (TFP) and a speciﬁcd e g r e eo f
skill bias in each sector (maintaining the assumption that in either country sector X is more skill-intensive than
sector Y ). These assumptions are summarized by the following functional forms and parameter restrictions:
AYj(Z)=Λj exp(gYjZ),A Xj(Z)=Λj exp(gXjZ)w i t hgXj >g Yj,j =1 ,2( 5 )
where Λj captures the TFP of country j and gYj and gXj the degree of complementarity between technology
and skills. Another diﬀerence between the traditional and the modern sector is that each variety of good X
requires a ﬁxed cost in the form of output that cannot be sold -we should think of this as a product development
ﬁxed cost.14 This ﬁxed cost is denoted by FXj. Finally, there is free entry in sector X and each ﬁrm in this
sector produces one and only one variety of good X.
14By contrast, no ﬁxed costs are required in sector Y .
73.3 Wage Schedule
Labor markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive so that each worker is paid the value of her marginal
product and the wage distribution over skills, Z, adjusts in order to equalize the unit cost of all ﬁrms using the
same technology. Given the technologies described above, the costs of producing one unit of good Y and one
unit of (any variety of) good X in country j are, respectively:
CYj= WYj(Z)/[Λj exp(gYjZ)] j =1 ,2
CXj = WXj(Z)/[Λj exp(gXjZ)] j =1 ,2
(6)
Perfect competition in sector Y ensures that prices are equal to unit costs which, given the choice of good
Y as the numeraire, implies 1 = PY 1 = PY 2 = CY . Workers choose to work in the sector where they receive
the highest wages. As proved in Yeaple (2005), there exists a worker indiﬀerent between working in one sector
or the other and whose skill level, denoted as Zj, is found via the following inter-industry wage equalization
condition:
WYj(Zj)=WXj(Zj) j =1 ,2( 7 )
Workers below the cut-oﬀ skill level Zj receive higher wages in sector Y and thus choose to work there, while
workers with skills above Zj are better oﬀ working in sector X. Consequently, the equilibrium wage schedule





Λj exp(gYjZ)0 ≤ Z ≤ Zj
ΛjCXjexp(gXjZ) Zj ≤ Z ≤ 1
j =1 ,2( 8 )
where CXj =e x p ( gYjZj)/ exp(gXjZj). The value of the threshold Zj is endogenously determined in equilibrium,
and with it one can characterize the entire wage schedule. The logarithmic wage schedule (measured in units
of the numeraire) is a piece-wise linear function with a kink at Zj. Given the parameter restrictions, it has a
steeper gradient to the right of the kink. Panels A and B of Figure 1 show its typical shape and the eﬀects,
discussed below, of changing several parameters.
Aggregating over workers with diﬀerent skills and dividing by the mass of workers we obtain the average















We solve separately for the equilibrium of each country j =1 ,2i na u t a r k y .P r o ﬁt maximization and free entry




CXj xj(i)=( σ − 1)FXj for i ∈ [0,N j] (10)
In the symmetric equilibrium the varieties of the diﬀerentiated good X are sold at the same price pj(i)=pj


















The model is closed with the market clearing conditions in sector Y :15




Substituting (9), (11) and (12) as well as CXj =e x p ( gY Zj)/ exp(gXjZj) into (13) and simplifying, we obtain
one implicit function =(.)t h a td e ﬁnes the equilibrium cut-oﬀ value Zj for each country as a function of the
parameter values and the distribution of skills Gj(Z):






























3.5 Market Size, Productivity and Factor Endowments in Autarky
Equation (14) can be used to derive exact predictions. In particular, we focus on the eﬀects of three key variables:
the market size of each economy, the productivity diﬀerences between economies and the factor (skill) endowment
of each economy (all considered to be exogenous), and analyze their eﬀects on the specialization pattern of a
country, its price level and its real wages. Given the parameter restrictions assumed above, (σ>θ>1a n d
gXj >g Yj) and beginning with two identical countries, we are able to characterize the eﬀects when we change
15By Walras’ Law the clearing of market Y ensures the clearing of market X as well.
9those variables in one country relative to the other. We provide the intuition for each proposition in the text
and relegate the details of the proof to Appendix A.
Proposition 1: Given countries i and j, characterized by otherwise identical parameters, if country j has a
larger population than country i (Mj >M i ), in autarky it would have a lower skill cutoﬀ level Z, it would be
relatively more specialized in sector X, and would have a lower price index P and higher real wages W(Z)/P
for workers of any skill level, relative to country i.
Intuitively, an increase in country size, Mj, results in an expansion of sector X as a larger market allows for
more varieties. This has the eﬀect of reducing the price of the composite good X, PXj, (inversely related to
Nj). Consumers shift their expenditure towards good X more than proportionally, so that the share spent in
sector X, s(PXj), increases. Due to increased demand for their output, ﬁrms in sector X can pay higher wages
so that the unit cost CX increases. The logarithmic wage schedule in sector X shifts up while the wage schedule
for sector Y remains unchanged. This is represented in panel A of Figure 1 by the upward shift of the steeper




1 and some workers
move from sector Y to sector X. In addition to the upward shift of the wage schedule in sector X,s i n c et h e
overall price index decreases, the real wages of all workers increase.16
Proposition 2: Given countries i and j, characterized by otherwise identical parameters, if country j has
larger absolute productivity than country i (Λj > Λi ), in autarky it would have a lower skill cutoﬀ level Z, it
would be relatively more specialized in sector X, and would have a lower price index P and higher real wages
W(Z)/P for workers of any skill level, relative to country i.
An increase in the average productivity Λj has the same qualitative and quantitative eﬀects as the increase
in Mj on the cut-oﬀ skill level Zj and on the number of varieties, the price and the expenditure and production
shares of X.I n f a c t , t h e p r o d u c t MjΛj captures a country’s “market potential”. A larger market potential
increases the expenditure on good X more than proportionally, with the same eﬀects explained above. The only
diﬀerence with respect to an increase in Mj is that the increase in the productivity term Λj also has a direct
impact on the entire wage schedule (see Equation 8). Graphically, in this case both the ﬂatter and the steeper
section of the logarithmic wage schedule (in units of Y ) move up, with the shift of the steeper part being larger






Proposition 3: Given countries i and j, characterized by otherwise identical parameters, if country j has a
more productive technology in sector X than country i (gXj >g Xi) then, as long as the parameter θ is close
to one, in autarky it would have a higher skill cut-oﬀ level Z, lower price index and it would be relatively more
specialized in sector X. Real wages W(Z)/P would also be higher for workers initially in sector Y and for the
16Notice that in Figure 1 the logarithmic wage is represented in units of the numeraire (Y ). Hence the changes in the real wage
due to changes in the overall price index (P)a r en o tr e p o r t e d .
10workers with skill level above a certain threshold.
An increase in the productivity of sector X allows the same number of workers to produce more varieties
of the good, increasing the relative supply of X. As the income and the supply of workers in Y do not change
this decreases the expenditure per unit of variety of X. Since there is now more competition in sector X, the
skill level of the infra-marginal worker increases. This is illustrated in Figure 1 Panel B. Since the slope gXj
increases, the logarithmic wage schedule in sector X shifts down and tilts upward (depicted by the grey line),




2 . T h ei n c r e a s ei nt h en u m b e ro fv a r i e t i e so fX decreases
PX and, hence, the price index. This results in a larger share of income of country j being spent in sector
X, implying an increased relative specialization of the country in sector X. All workers who were initially in
sector Y (between 0 and Z
A
0 in Figure 1 Panel B) receive higher real wages, as they experience no changes
in their nominal wages but face a lower price index. Workers with skill levels above Z∗ in Figure 1 Panel B
(the intersection of the new wage curve with the old one) beneﬁt from the increase in nominal wages due to
t h ei n c r e a s ei ngXj, as well as from the decrease in prices. Only workers with skills between Z
A
0 and Z∗ (some
of which move from sector X to Y ) may experience a decrease in real wages despite the decrease in the price
index.
Proposition 4: Given countries i and j, characterized by otherwise identical parameters, if country j has a
larger share of highly-skilled workers relative to country i (Gj(Z) ≤ Gi(Z) for all Z), then in autarky it would
have a higher skill cut-oﬀ level Z, it would be relatively more specialized in sector X, and would have lower
price index P and higher real wages W(Z)/P for workers in sector Y, though there is an ambiguous eﬀect on
the real wages of workers in sector X.
C o n s i d e rt h es i m p l ec a s ei nw h i c hw em o v es o m em a s so fw o r k e r sf r o ms k i l ll e v e lZ0 to skill level Z0 >Z 0,
assuming that workers with skill Z0 work in sector X to begin with. In this case the productivity in sector
X as a whole increases and this in turn increases the supply of X and the number of varieties produced, and
decreases the price of X. This implies that the unit compensation for workers in sector X, CX, decreases so that
the logarithmic wage schedule in sector X shifts down and the cut-oﬀ skill level Zj increases. This corresponds
to the parallel shift down of the steeper portion of the wage schedule (in grey) in Figure 1 Panel B. As the
price index decreases, the real wages of workers in sector Y increase. However, for any skill level, the real wages
in sector X may decrease or increase depending on the relative magnitude of the price eﬀect compared to the
decrease in the unit cost, CX.
In matching the model to the empirical characteristics of the economies of Western and Eastern Europe
we have the following: (i) a larger population in Western Europe, or Country 1 in our model (M1 >M 2); (ii)
higher absolute productivity in the West (Λ1 > Λ2); (iii) higher relative productivity of the West in sector X
11(gX1 >g X2) and of the East in sector Y (gY 1 <g Y 2);17 and (iv) a larger share of highly educated workers in
the West, G1(Z) <G2(Z) for all Z. Characteristics (ii) and (iii) reﬂect the overall productive advantage and
the stronger ”skill-bias” of the technology of more industrialized countries, as documented in recent work by
Caselli and Coleman (2006).18 Hence, in light of Propositions 1 to 4, in autarky the West should exhibit lower
prices and higher wages in units of the numeraire, especially for highly educated workers (due to features i, ii
and iii) as well as greater specialization (income share) in sector X, relative to the East. As for the cut-oﬀ skill
level Zj, characteristics (i) and (ii) would imply a larger value of Zj in the East, while (iii) and (iv) would
imply a lower value. In Figure 2 we represent the logarithmic real wage schedules in Country 1 (West) and 2
(East), namely ln(W1(Z))−ln(P1) in the upper panel and ln(W2(Z))−ln(P2) in the lower panel. As observed,
the intercept (at Z = 0) of the logarithmic wage is higher in the West relative to the East, due to its higher
TFP and lower overall price index. Figure 2 also shows that the wage schedule is ﬂatter below Zj and steeper
above it for the West relative to the East (that is, there exists a larger college-primary school wage premium
in the West) with Zj being slightly larger in the West. Finally, the largest cross-country real wage diﬀerentials
are experienced by the highly educated workers.
4 Opening to Trade and Migration
M a i n t a i n i n gt h ea s s u m p t i o n so nt e c h n o l o g ya n dp r e f e r e n c e sd e s c r i b e da b o v e ,i nt h i ss e c t i o nw ea n a l y z et h e
eﬀects of trade (section 4.2) and then migration (section 4.3). However, before considering trade liberalization,
we discuss the incentives and potential eﬀects of migration if labor mobility was to take place in a tradeless
world. This is commonly done in the analysis of migration in cross-country models (as trade is essentially
ignored) and serves as a useful reference point.
4.1 Migration Patterns and Gains in the Absence of Trade
The migration incentives are given by the diﬀerences, for each skill level Z, in the logarithm of real wages of each
country (depicted in the upper and lower panels of Figure 2). As can be observed in Figure 2, in the absence of
any type of migration costs and for plausible values of the parameters, the wage schedule of Country 2 (the East)
is below that of Country 1 (the West) at any skill level. This means that all workers in the East would have
economic incentives to migrate to the West. However, if we introduce migration costs, the real wage-schedule
of Country 1, net of migration costs, would shift down. We show this in Figure 3 where t h eg r e yl i n er e p r e s e n t s
17We also assume that FX1 >F X2. Intuitively, Country 1 uses a technology in sector X that is more sophisticated and expensive
(with a higher ﬁxed cost) than the one used in Country 2, but it is also more productive, particularly when combined with highly
skilled workers.
18More generally one could express the functions AXj(Z)a n dAYj(Z)a sΛjfXj(Z)a n dΛjfYj(Z) with the restriction Λ1 > Λ2
(reﬂecting a higher total factor productivity in Country 1) and the condition ∂ lnfX1(Z)/∂Z > ∂ lnfX2(Z)/∂Z > ∂ lnfYi(Z)/∂Z,
capturing the skill-bias of the technology in sector X over that in sector Y and the stronger skill-bias in Country 1.
12the real wage schedule of Country 2 while the black lines depict the real wage schedule in Country 1 net of
migration costs. For ease of illustration, Figure 3 assumes that migration costs are a proportion δ of wages, so
that the logarithmic wage schedule net of migration costs is a parallel shift down of Country 1’s original real
wage schedule.19 For δ close enough to 1 (δPROHIBITIVE) the negative shift is large enough as to put the
migration cost-adjusted wage schedule of Country 1 below the wage schedule of Country 2 for all relevant skill
levels. In this case there is no incentive for any worker to move. As migration costs decrease to δHIGH (see the
intermediate black wage schedule in Figure 3) all workers above the threshold Z
High
0 would migrate, as their
real wage in Country 1 net of migration costs would be higher than their wage in Country 2. Finally, given the
shape of the wage schedules, if migration costs decrease further to δLOW (captured by the highest black wage
schedule in Figure 3) migration patterns become V-shaped: those with very low skills (below ZLow
oo )a sw e l la s
those with high skills (above ZHigh
oo ) would migrate. Workers with intermediate skill levels have the smallest
(or no) incentives to migrate to Country 1 even when migration costs are low.
Considering the case of high migration costs (the most plausible scenario even if legal barriers to migration
are substantially reduced), migration mainly increases the supply of highly educated workers in Country 1 and
decreases that of Country 2. Based on Propositions 1 and 4 of section 3.5 this has the following eﬀects:
1. The number of varieties of good X produced in Country 1 increases and the price PX decreases. This has
positive real wage eﬀects for workers in sector Y. As for workers in sector X, they experience two eﬀects:
t h es a m ep o s i t i v ep r i c ee ﬀect and a negative competition eﬀect, as their wage decreases relative to that of
workers in sector Y .T h eo v e r a l le ﬀect on their real wages is ambiguous. Still, average wages in Country
1 increase unambiguously.
2. By contrast, in Country 2 the number of varieties of X decreases and the price PX increases. Clearly, the
real wages of workers in Y decline, and using the same reasoning as before the eﬀect on the real wages of
the workers remaining in sector X is ambiguous, while migrants leaving Country 2 increase their net real
wage. Overall, the average real wages in Country 2 decrease.
In sum, in the absence of trade, the real wage eﬀects of migration are positive for the migrants and for
the receiving country overall and negative for the sending country, which loses its most educated workers and
experiences an increase in the price index. The eﬀect is particularly negative for the less educated workers
remaining in the sending country. As we will see next, the consequences of migration are quite diﬀerent when
labor mobility takes place in conjunction with trade.
19In our simulations in Section 5 we consider more complex migration costs. They have a component proportional to wages and
a ﬁxed component. In this case, the (migration cost-adjusted) wage schedule of country 1 would shift down and slightly rotate
counterclockwise, as ﬁxed costs aﬀect less skilled workers proportionally more. The qualitative implications, though, are similar to
the case of proportional costs illustrated in Figure 3.
134.2 Trade
Consider the two economies described in section 3 and allow them to trade with each other. For simplicity
we will assume that good Y is traded at no cost so that pY 1 = pY 2 = pY ,20 while we allow for iceberg-type
trade costs τ ≥ 1 for good X. The consumers in country j can now buy varieties of good X produced in either
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where pj is the price of the varieties produced locally, and piτ is the price paid for imported varieties. Again,
s(PXj) denotes the expenditure share that consumers in country j devote to the composite good X while Ej
is aggregate expenditure in country j and, since the model has no capital accumulation, it equals total income:




1−σ + Ni(piτ)1−σ¤ 1
1−σ i,j =1 ,2 i 6= j (16)
On the production side, proﬁt maximization yields the equilibrium price pj for each variety of good X sold
domestically and free entry determines the scale of production. The conditions are identical to those in (10)
with the only diﬀerence that now the quantity of each variety produced in country j is the sum of the demand
at home and abroad, xj = xjj + xjiτ.
As in autarky, the skill threshold in each country, which determines the assignment of workers across sectors,
Z
T
j (with the T superscript denoting the equilibrium with trade), is given by an inter-industry wage equalization
condition similar to (7). The value of these thresholds can be pinned down from the world market clearing
conditions, namely the market clearing condition for the homogeneous good Y , for each variety of good X
produced in Country 1 and for each variety of good X produced in Country 2 (see the equations in Appendix
B).
4.2.1 Costless Trade
In order to identify the eﬀects of trade it is useful to begin analyzing the particular case of costless trade
(i.e., when τ = 1) as it yields simpler equilibrium conditions. In the next section we will explain how trade costs
(τ>1) modify some of the eﬀects of trade. The most important implication of free trade is price equalization
across the border for each variety of good X, p1 = p2, that in turn implies equalization of the unit costs
20This assumption ensures a common wage per unit of skill for workers in sector Y in the two countries and simpliﬁes the analysis
considerably.
14CX1 = CX2 = CX. Together with full access to all varieties from either country, this also implies equalization
of the price of the composite good, PX1 = PX2 = PX, and thus of the overall price index, P1 = P2 = P. This
result simpliﬁes substantially the two market clearing conditions for varieties of X produced in each country
(see Appendix B), which when divided by one another simplify to the following expression:
exp
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Proposition 5: Relative to autarky, in free trade Country 1 specializes in the production of the diﬀerentiated









Proof: Country 1 has a more productive technology in sector X than Country 2 (i.e., gX1 >g X2)a n di s
relatively abundant in highly educated workers. By Propositions 3 and 4 above, this implies that in autarky
CX1 <C X2 and p1 <p 2. The convergence in prices under free trade implies a relative increase in p1 (and thus
CX1)s ot h a tt h et h r e s h o l dl e v e lZ1 decreases. This means an increase in the share of workers in sector X. The
opposite happens in Country 2 where a lower value of CX2 implies a lower logarithmic wage schedule for sector
X and an increase in Z2 relative to autarky.
Corollary: Under free trade, the larger the comparative advantage of Country 1 in sector X (i.e., the larger
the ratio
(gX1−gY 1)
(gX2−gY 2)), the larger the share of workers of Country 1 engaged in sector X, relative to Country 2.
That is, a lower value of Z
T
1 relative to Z
T
2 .21
Figure 4 shows the shift in the logarithmic real wage schedule from autarky (black line) to the equilibrium
with costless trade (grey line). Two eﬀects take place. First, as stated in Proposition 5 there is an expansion








2 ). Hence, trade
liberalization leads to an increase in the relative wages of workers of sector X in Country 1 and a relative
decrease of those wages in Country 2 (the typical Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect). Even with full price convergence
and higher relative eﬃciency of Country 2 in producing good Y there need not be full specialization of Country
2 in free trade. This is because, due to the heterogeneity of workers, those with very high skills are relatively
more productive in sector X, also in Country 2, and would rather work in that sector. This is true unless
the technological diﬀerences between countries in sector X are large enough (gX1 >> gX2) as to generate an
international equilibrium price of X low enough so that even the most skilled worker in Country 2 (with Z =1 )
21See the proof in Appendix B.
15would rather work in sector Y .22 Moreover, due to the increase in varieties, the common price level, P, in free
trade is lower than the prices of each country (P1 and P2) in autarky. This implies a parallel shift up of the
real wage schedules in both countries. In Figure 4 (as in the simulations of section 5.2.1) the upward shift of
the real wage schedule in Country 2 is large enough that even workers in sector X gain in real terms.
4.2.2 Costly Trade
With costly trade the extent to which each country can exploit its comparative advantage is reduced. The
convergence in prices is only partial and thus the beneﬁts derived from trade are more limited than under free
trade. As for the productive specialization patterns, non-zero trade costs reinforce the “home market” eﬀect
which allows the large country to host a disproportionately larger number of ﬁrms in sector X.I np a r t i c u l a r ,
this home market eﬀect is larger for intermediate trade costs, as zero costs eliminate the home market eﬀect
and prohibitive costs eliminate the foreign demand. So, beginning from high values, as trade costs decrease
comparative advantage and the home market eﬀect ﬁrst operate in the same direction, namely increasing
Country 1’s specialization in sector X. This specialization reaches a maximum for some intermediate value of
trade costs and as trade costs decrease to values close to zero the home market eﬀect becomes less relevant and
only comparative advantage is left.
Figure 5 plots the specialization patterns of each country (measured by the share of workers in sector X)
against trade costs. The graph features the simulation results based on the parameter values used in section 5
t om a t c ht h ef e a t u r e so fW e s t e r na n dE a s t e r nE u r o p e .A tvery high trade costs, the patterns of specialization
approach those in autarky (with employment shares in sector X of 34% and 28% in Country 1 and 2, respec-
tively). With free trade (τ = 1) the relative specialization of Country 1 in sector X is stronger than in autarky
(36% of workers in sector X compared to 22% in Country 2). However, the maximum relative specialization is
reached around τ =1 .3 when 38% of the employment in Country 1 (and only 5% in Country 2) is engaged in
sector X. For the parameter conﬁguration used we also observe that Western Europe (Country 1) is very far
from full specialization (in sector X) while for some intermediate values of trade costs Eastern Europe (Country
2) is not too far from complete specialization in sector Y .
4.3 Trade and Migration
Suppose that in addition to trade Countries 1 and 2 allow the movement of workers across the border. The
equilibrium is characterized as before with only some modiﬁcations in order to accommodate the phenomenon
of migration. For the sake of brevity we relegate to Appendix C the equilibrium conditions determining the
threshold skill levels between sectors X and Y in each country, the expression for prices, and the number of
22In this case, trade liberalization would lead to complete specialization of Country 2 in sector Y.
16varieties and wages, and focus here on the patterns of migration.
Migration is not free but entails three types of costs: those due to the loss of skills, the psychological costs
of living away from the country of origin and those generated by the legal barriers to international migration.
Migrants suﬀer a loss in their human capital since part of their skills, such as language, knowledge of the local
laws, norms and networks are speciﬁc to their country of origin. Consequently, we assume that a worker who
moves to another country is subject to a permanent productivity loss of a fraction δH ∈ (0,1) of her wage relative
to a native of comparable education. The psychological costs of migration, on the other hand, do not translate in
a reduction in productivity but they decrease the utility that a worker derives from migrating. Translating this
utility reduction in consumption-equivalent terms, we model such costs as a percentage reduction δP ∈ (0,1) in
the real income (but not the productivity) enjoyed by the migrants. Finally, we consider the costs associated
with the legal restrictions on international mobility. They are harder to model, yet it is obvious that for several
skill groups those costs are close to being prohibitive (which eliminates altogether the possibility of migrating)
and even when they are not prohibitive they entail a signiﬁcant amount of resources that are “wasted” or
unproductive. It is not clear whether legal costs of migration should be considered as proportional to wages or
as ﬁxed costs. If we think of the legal barriers as the paperwork, security checks and all the costs associated
with the process of obtaining a working visa and settling in the foreign country, which all migrants experience,
it seems reasonable to consider them as ﬁx e dc o s t s .I no u rs i m u l a t i o n si ns e c t i on 5.2.2 we consider legal costs as
a ﬁxed cost, DB, independent of the skill level of the individual.23 In sum, the migration costs described above
are modeled as a reduction by a fraction δ =( δH + δP) < 1 in the consumption wage enjoyed by the migrants
plus a ﬁxed cost DB. It is important to notice that even if a large part of the legal barriers to international
migration (DB) were to be removed, the remaining human capital losses and psychological costs would still
prevent perfect mobility.
The migratory patterns between Countries 1 and 2 are dictated by the cross-country real wage diﬀerences
at each skill level. Figure 3 is still valid in illustrating qualitatively the migration incentives in the presence of
trade.
Proposition 6: For migration costs lower than the prohibitive level, workers with skill levels higher than a
threshold Z
TMH
2 will migrate from Country 2 to Country 1. All the immigrants (except for the marginal one)
will receive a production and consumption wage, net of costs, higher than they would receive in Country 2. The
cut-oﬀ skill level Z
TMH
2 is given by the condition of equalization of (migration-cost adjusted) real wages across
23If, on the other hand, legal costs hamper the possibility of transferring schooling degrees and certiﬁcations, or if they generate
a disadvantage in the search for jobs, they are likely to be better captured by a proportional factor (since they then take the form
of a foregone share of wages). In Iranzo and Peri (2007) and in simulations (available upon request) we show the eﬀect of reducing
legal migration costs when they are proportional to wages. The qualitative eﬀects are very similar to those illustrated in this paper



















Proof: Figure 3 provides the graphical proof that for high migration costs the real wage schedule in Country
1 net of immigration costs (intermediate black schedule) is above the real wage schedule in Country 2 (the grey
schedule) for Z>Z
TMH
2 (deﬁn e db ye q u a t i o n1 9a n dr e p r e s e n t e di nF i g u r e3b yv a l u eZhigh
o ). Hence, for high
migration costs, only highly educated workers in Country 2 will migrate.
Proposition 7: For low migration costs, but still large enough so that not all workers migrate out of Country
2, workers with skills higher than threshold Z
TMH
2 and workers with skill levels below a threshold Z
TML
2 would
migrate to Country 1. Both thresholds are determined by a wage equalization condition similar to (19).
Proof: Figure 3 provides again the representation of the relevant real wage comparison. The highest black
schedule in Figure 3 represents the migration cost-adjusted real wages in Country 1 when migration costs are
low. As observed, it crosses the real wage schedule of Country 2 twice.24 The lower crossing point deﬁnes
Z
TML
2 and the higher crossing point deﬁnes Z
TMH
2 . Workers with skills below Z
TML
2 and those with skills
above Z
TMH
2 experience a real wage gain by moving from Country 2 to Country 1.
These patterns of migration are similar to those already described in the scenario of migration and no
trade (section 4.1). What is diﬀerent now is that, thanks to trade, the gains from migration are shared by the
two countries and accrue to each group, while in the scenario with no trade they were conﬁned to Country 1.
Focusing on the case of high migration costs, represented in Figure 6, we ﬁrst summarize the eﬀects of migration
under free trade (as it is clearer and easier to understand). Then we comment on the eﬀects of migration with
costly trade which is the case we simulate in section 5.2.2
1. All migrant workers experience real wage gains and the total production of good X increases.
As for Proposition 7, all workers with skills higher than Z
TMH
2 earn higher wages, net of migration costs, in
Country 1 and have higher productivity than in their country of origin. Thus the total combined production of
good X increases.
2. Price levels decrease in both countries.
As the total production and the number of varieties of X increase, its price PX, and thus the overall price
index, decreases.25 Thanks to trade, workers in both countries beneﬁt from the increased variety at lower prices.
3. Less educated workers in both countries experience an increase in real wages.
24When part of the migration costs are ﬁxed, as in the present case, in order to ensure that a portion of the wage schedule in
Country 1 is ﬂa t t e rt h a ni nC o u n t r y2t h eﬁxed component should not be too large. In our simulation, the case with a double
intersection of the wage schedules occurs for very low legal costs.
25With free trade, the reduction will be the same in both countries and if trade is costly, the decrease in PX will be smaller with
PX1 decreasing more than PX2.
18The wages of less educated workers, in terms of Y , are determined by the productivity parameters, which
do not change with migration. However, as a consequence of the decrease in the price index, workers in both
countries experience an increase in their real wages. As for the workers in sector X in Country 1, they will
experience a decrease in their wage in units of the numeraire, but the drop in the price index will compensate
(partially or totally) the wage decrease in real terms.
Figure 6 illustrates the change in the wage schedules going from free trade (black schedule) to free trade
and migration (grey schedule) in the case of high migration costs. The highly educated in Country 2, with
skills above Z
TMH
2 , move to Country 1 and sector X disappears from Country 2. The dashed wage schedule in
grey indicates that no worker in that skill range is left in Country 2 earning that potential wage. At the same
time, the upward shift of real wages, due to the reduction in the price level (point 3 above), implies that each
native of Country 2 is better oﬀ. The highly educated receive higher real wages when they migrate to Country
1 and the less educated who remain in Country 2 experience a real wage increase. Only the highly educated in
Country 1 experience a decrease in real wages due to the competition eﬀect from immigrants.
The eﬀects of migration with costly trade are intermediate between the one with free trade described above
and the one with no trade described in section 4.1. In particular, in Country 2 the loss of highly educated workers
reduces the number of varieties produced domestically. However, their higher productivity abroad increases the
number of varieties available internationally. As those varieties are imported by Country 2 at a cost, the relative
size of productivity diﬀerentials in sector X together with the magnitude of trade costs determine whether the
net eﬀect of migration on real wages (via price levels) of Country 2 is positive or negative. Clearly as the eﬀect
is positive in free trade and negative with no trade (prohibitive trade costs), there must be a level of trade costs
below which the net eﬀect of migration is positive and negative above it. Thus, ultimately whether this eﬀect
is positive or negative is an empirical question. Our simulations for Eastern and Western Europe in Table 4
use the actual productivity diﬀerentials and the estimated trade costs (τ =1 .4) between the two regions. They
show that allowing migration would produce an increase in the overall production of good X, a decrease of
the price levels in both countries and an increase in the real wages of less educated workers in both countries.
This means that for the observed trade costs and productivity diﬀerentials prevailing in Europe around 2000
the qualitative implications of freer worker mobility in the model with trade costs are similar to those for the
model with free trade.
5 Economic Integration between Eastern and Western Europe
The case of Western (EU-15) and Eastern European countries is an interesting example of two regions that have
moved, over approximately 20 years, from essentially no economic interaction with each other (up until 1989)
to trade liberalization and to the elimination (by 2011) of legal restrictions to labor mobility. During the 1990s
19several Trade Agreements between Western and Eastern European countries were signed culminating with the
entry in 2004 and 2006 of 10 Eastern European countries to the E.U.26 Trade liberalization, however, was not
accompanied by the liberalization of labor markets as most Western countries kept in place clauses allowing
them to restrict immigration from the East until 2011.27 As the transitional restrictions on labor mobility phase
out, migration from the East to the West may increase substantially. In this section we use the model to predict
how much migration is to be expected and with what consequences. We start by describing the parameterization
of the model in section 5.1, while section 5.2 presents the simulations.
5.1 Parameterization of the Model
Table 2 summarizes the parameterization of the model. The values of the parameters are either obtained from
the data or calibrated to reproduce the features of Eastern and Western European economies. Workers’ skills,
Z, are measured as years of schooling. We re-scale this variable so that it ranges from 0 (no schooling) to
1 (corresponding to a Doctorate degree, obtained after 20 years of schooling). Hence, one year of schooling
equals 0.05 units of Z. Measuring skills with years of schooling has several advantages. First, comparable
schooling data for Eastern and Western European countries are available from the Barro and Lee (2001) dataset
beginning in the 1980s. Second, the Mincerian regression approach to wages ﬁnds that the natural logarithm
of individual wages is a linear function of years of schooling. This is consistent with the wage schedule implied
by our model. Third, particularly since the 1990s the returns to schooling for the highly educated in rich
economies like Western Europe have been larger than those for the less educated. This also matches well our
characterization of the wage schedule: ﬂatter for low values of Z and steeper for high values of Z.W eu s et h e
schooling distributions in the year 2000 for Germany as representative of the average EU-15, and Poland as
representative of the Eastern European members. We consider four educational groups according to the highest
educational level achieved: less than primary education, primary education, secondary education, and college
degree or more. Table 2 reports the share of the population in each of the four schooling groups in the early
1990s which we use to deﬁne the skill distribution for Western Europe (G1(Z)) and Eastern Europe (G2(Z)).
The parameters gXj and gYj characterize the technologies employed in sectors X and Y, respectively. They
can be empirically inferred from the logarithmic wage schedules using equation (8). The parameter gYj equals
the returns to schooling of less educated workers (to the left of Zj)w h i l egXj equals the returns to schooling
for highly educated workers (to the right of Zj). Our calibration is based on data on returns to education
from previous studies, particularly Caselli and Coleman (2006) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004)28.T h e
26These were Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia (which entered the EU in 2004),
Bulgaria and Romania (which entered in 2006).
27The only EU countries that allowed free labor mobility from the beginning were the UK, Ireland and Sweden.
28They collected data on average returns to schooling from Mincerian regressions for several countries. We combine those two
studies to calibrate gYj and gXj for Western Europe (Germany) and Eastern Europe (Poland). More precisely, we calibrate gYj
and gXj so that:
20values obtained are reported in Table 2. Consistent with our assumptions, the Mincerian estimates show that
i) returns to skills are higher in sector X than in sector Y for both countries, ii) returns to skills in sector X
are larger in Western Europe while returns to skills in sector Y are larger in Eastern Europe. We choose the
total factor productivity (TFP) levels, Λj,a n dt h eﬁxed cost parameters, FXj, to match the per capita income
diﬀerential between East and West Europe at the end of the 1980s, and to ensure a cut-oﬀ skill level in autarky,
Z
A
j , around 12 years of schooling (secondary degree) for Eastern Europe and a little higher, (some college), for
Western Europe. Normalizing Λ2 =1 , this implies Λ1 = 2. These parameters deliver an autarky equilibrium
where the real per capita income of Eastern Europe is 0.37 times that of Western Europe, which matches the
per capita income diﬀerential between Eastern and Western Europe as of 1989.29 We consider the late 1980s as
representative of the “autarky” case. The population of working age (16 to 65 years of age) in Eastern Europe
was around one third of the working age population of the Western European countries as of 1989 and since
then the two blocks have followed similar demographic trends. This implies M1 =1a n dM2 =0 .3.
The rest of the parameters are assumed to be common to both regions and are reported in the lower part
of Table 2. The parameter θ, which measures the substitutability between goods X and Y ,i se q u a lt ot h e
substitutability between workers that produce those goods (namely, more and less educated workers). The
consensus estimate for this elasticity in the literature is around 1.5 (see Katz and Murphy 1992, and Ciccone
and Peri 2005). The value of σ captures the degree of substitutability between varieties of good X.T h i s i s
an important parameter as the magnitude of the gains from trade due to new varieties depends (inversely) on
this parameter. Broda and Weinstein (2004, 2006) produced several estimates of the elasticity of substitution
between diﬀerentiated varieties in 3-digit SITC sectors which would correspond to σ. W ec h o o s eav a l u eo f
σ = 4 as the baseline speciﬁcation (their mean value)30 and conduct robustness checks for values of σ between
3a n d∞.31 The parameter β is chosen to be around 0.5, which delivers an expenditure share for good X in
autarky of 0.42, close to the expenditure share on diﬀerentiated high-tech goods in Western Europe in the early
1990s.32
- The wage premia of workers with ”college completed” vs. those with ”primary completed only” equal the premia estimated by
Caselli and Coleman (2006) for Germany and Poland.
- The yearly Mincerian returns for Germany and Poland, obtained as an average of the returns to schooling of the low and highly
educated (where the highly educated group is deﬁned as those with a High School diploma or more), match the average returns
reported in Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004).
29Based on data from the Penn World Tables. Hall and Jones (1999) report similar numbers: the ratio of output per worker in
West Germany relative to Hungary in the late 1980s was 0.36 and the ratio of output per worker in France relative to Poland was
0.33.
30The value of σ = 4 also roughly coincides with the mean estimate of the elasticity of substitution for the 4-digit SITC- sectors
that Rauch (1999) classiﬁes as diﬀerentiated goods.
31Available from te authors upon request.
32We calculate the consumption share in diﬀerentiated goods using the Eurostat Statistics 3-digit consumption classiﬁcation as
follows. Out of all tradeable goods and services (ie, excluding construction and real state, education, health and hotel services) we
consider food and beverages, clothing and apparel as homogeneous, and all the others (medical products, vehicles, audio-visual and
information processing equipment, furnishings and home equipment, etc.) as diﬀerentiated.
215.2 Simulations: the Eﬀects of Trade and Migration
Following the theoretical approach, we begin with the scenario of autarky and analyze ﬁrst the eﬀects of trade
liberalization only (section 5.2.1) and then the eﬀects of relaxing the legal restrictions to labor mobility (section
5.2.2).
5.2.1 Trade Liberalization and no Migration
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 3 report the values of the most relevant variables in the autarky equilibrium
(speciﬁcation I) and under free trade (speciﬁcation II) for Western and Eastern Europe. For ease of comparison,
we standardize to one the price level and the per capita GDP in Western Europe in autarky. In the autarky
equilibrium the real income per capita in Eastern Europe was 37% that in the West (matching the data in
1989) and the price index in Eastern Europe was 34% higher than in Western Europe. As for the productive
specialization, 34% of the workers in Western Europe and only 28% of Eastern Europe worked in the high-tech
diﬀerentiated sector X. The diﬀerence in specialization is not too large because in autarky each country needs
to produce all of its consumption goods. The four rows in the mid-section of Table 3 report the real wages of
workers by educational group.33 In autarky, workers of any schooling level in Eastern Europe are paid less than
in Western Europe; even the college educated in the East do not reach the real wage of the least educated in
Western Europe. The large productivity and price level diﬀerentials are the reasons for these wage diﬀerences.
With respect to the autarky scenario, trade liberalization introduces three signiﬁcant changes. First, prices
tend to converge and, in Speciﬁcation II with free trade, there is complete price equalization between East
and West. Second, the change in relative prices induces countries to specialize in the production of the goods
in which they enjoy a comparative advantage. Western Europe increases its relative employment in sector X
(under free trade 36% of the labor force works in that sector versus 34% in autarky) while the East increases its
employment in sector Y (81% of the labor force works in Y under free trade while only 72% in autarky). Third,
more varieties of X a r ep r o d u c e da n dc o n s u m e da n d ,i nt h ec a s eo ff r e et r a d e ,a tal o w e rp r i c ei nb o t hc o u n t r i e s ,
so that the overall price level decreases. Notice that it decreases much more in the East (going from 1.34 to 0.99,
experiencing a 26% decrease) than in the West (where it goes from 1 to 0.99 experiencing only a 0.8% decrease)
relative to the autarky price, because the East gains access to a much larger basket of new diﬀerentiated goods.
In terms of real wages, two eﬀects take place. On the one hand, trade has the typical Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect,
increasing the relative wages of the high-skilled workers in the West (where the college-primary school premium
increases from 1.81 to 2.07) and those of the low-skilled in the East (where the college-primary school premium
decreases from 1.65 to 1.60). Moreover, there are beneﬁts to all groups of workers from the decrease in the price
of the diﬀerentiated good X (the gains from variety). This second eﬀect is large enough so that in terms of real
33Always standardized by the autarky per capita income of Western Europe.
22wages each single group gains. As indicated by the per capita real income (in the second row) both countries
gain, on average, from trade. The gains, however, are much larger for Eastern Europe (+34%) than for Western
Europe (+1.9%).
Trade liberalization between Eastern and Western Europe was largely achieved by 2004. Hence, we are
able to check whether our model’s predictions match the actual data in 2004 (which is also the most recent
year for which most data is available). In particular, we check the predicted convergence in real income per
capita, the predicted volume of trade between East and West Europe and the predicted composition of trade
between goods X and Y . The prediction on the composition of trade (non-diﬀerentiated, traditional goods, Y,
and diﬀerentiated goods X) is very important because the gains from variety depend largely on the volume of
diﬀerentiated trade. We use the popular classiﬁcation of non-diﬀerentiated and diﬀerentiated goods introduced
by Rauch (1999)34 and compute the share of trade in diﬀerentiated goods between East and West Europe for
the year 2004. Column II of Table 3 shows that under free trade the predicted volume of trade between the
two economies is about 10% of their joint GDP (reported in the second to the last row) and the share of trade
in diﬀerentiated goods is around 78% (reported in the last row). The simulations also predict an increase in
Eastern European per capita income to almost 50% (0.487=0.496/1.019) of the Western income per capita. The
actual data for 2004 shows that the bilateral volume of trade was 9% of total European tradeable GDP,35 the
share of diﬀerentiated trade amounted to 77.9% according to what Rauch (1999) calls a “liberal” classiﬁcation
and 81.5% according to a “conservative” classiﬁcation, while the income per capita in the East was equal to
42% of that in Western Europe.36 So the model with no trade costs slightly over-predicts the volume of trade
and the real per capita income convergence and predicts exactly the split of trade between diﬀerentiated and
non-diﬀerentiated goods.
Using the degree of freedom provided in the model by trade costs, τ,we use it to match the predicted volume
of trade to the actual volume (9% of European tradeable GDP). The results are reported in the speciﬁcation
with Costly Trade in Column III of Table 3. The “calibrated” value of trade costs is 40% of the traded value (i.e.,
τ =1 .4). This is not unreasonable if we consider that it includes transport costs as well as all the bureaucratic
hurdles, non-tariﬀ barriers, and diﬃculties associated with trade in services.37 I nt e r m so fi n c o m ep e rc a p i t a ,
the simulated value for Easter Europe in column III is 0.42 (=0.426/1.014) times that in Western Europe, which
34W et h a n kJ i mR a u c hf o rk i n d l ym a k i n gt h a tc l a s s i ﬁcation available to us. According to the classiﬁcation, non-diﬀerentiated
traded goods are those sold in organized world markets that therefore have worldwide quoted or reference prices, while diﬀerentiated
goods are those for which no worldwide quoted or reference prices exist.
35Tradeable GDP is calculated using the OECD National Accounts data for Europe in 2004 which disaggregates total gross value
added into 6 sectors: 1) Agriculture, hunting, forestry and ﬁshing; 2) Industry, including energy; 3) Construction; 4) Wholesale and
retail trade, repairs, hotels and restaurants, and transport; 5) Financial intermediation, real estate, renting and business activities;
6) Other service activities. We consider the ﬁrst 2 sectors as tradeable, which account for about a third of total value-added, and
the rest as non-tradeable. We are aware that this criterion understates the share of tradeable GDP as some of the goods and
services in the excluded sectors, such as some ﬁnancial and business services, are traded across the border. However, the lack of
more disaggregated sectoral data impedes us to obtain a more accurate share of tradeable GDP. Therefore, the ﬁgure of 9% should
be considered as an upper bound for the ratio of non-tradeable to tradeable GDP.
36Calculated using GDP data for European countries from the Penn World Tables.
37According to Hummels (2007), freight costs for most tradeable goods are close to 10% of their value.
23matches exactly the ratio measured in 2004. This income convergence is achieved through an increase in real
per capita income, with respect to autarky, by 1.4% for Western Europe and by 15.3% for Eastern Europe
(more moderate than in the case of no trade costs). Essentially, the entire real income convergence from 1989
to 2004 could be explained by the eﬀect of trade (we kept TFP constant at its pre-trade levels). Finally, in the
scenario with costly trade, the simulated share of trade in diﬀerentiated goods equals 54%, which is smaller than
with free trade and under-predicts the actual ﬁgures (77.9-81.5%). This is in part due to the fact that trade
costs are imposed only on sector X and thus they reduce relatively more the trade in diﬀerentiated products. If
anything, though, our model under-predicts the volume of (and therefore the beneﬁts from) diﬀerentiated trade
w h e nw es i m u l a t et h ec a s eo fc o s t l yt r a d e .
An interesting feature of the model with costly trade, conﬁrming the ﬁndings of section 4.2.2, is that
trade costs result in starker specialization patterns. Due to the stronger home market eﬀect, Western Europe
specializes more in sector X relative to the case with costless trade (38% of the labor force rather than 36%),
while Eastern Europe specializes more in sector Y (96% of the labor force rather than 81%).
5.2.2 Trade and Labor Mobility
Migration from Eastern to Western Europe began during the 1990s, yet restrictions on labor mobility, in the
form of laws, insider privileges and bureaucratic barriers, still exist. The last row of Table 1 shows the emigration
rates by educational level in Eastern Europe in 2000. As can be observed, the emigration rate of the highly
educated is three to four times that of other groups. Our model can easily explain this phenomenon: highly
educated workers have the largest incentives to migrate and, in the presence of high barriers to international
labor mobility, they are the only group migrating.
Speciﬁcation I of Table 4 shows the case where labor mobility is allowed and total migration costs are
calibrated so as to generate the migration rate of highly educated Eastern European workers as reported by
Docquier and Marfouk (2005)— that is, equal to 14%.38 The last row of the table reports the overall emigration
rate (emigrants/sending country residents) which equals 1.48% of the Eastern European population of working
age and its split between highly skilled (secondary education or more) and less skilled (primary education or less).
In this case all migrants have college education or more so the split is 100% and 0.39 The corresponding values
for Western Europe report the immigrants ﬂow relative to the labor force of Western Europe. This constitutes an
immigration rate (immigrants/receiving country residents) of 0.44%. Migration costs are calibrated as follows.
The value of δH, the (percentage) human capital loss, is based on Friedberg (2000) who estimates wage losses
from immigrants to Israel (many of them from Russia and Eastern Europe) of 25%, relative to similar natives.
38While emigration rates in the other education groups are not 0, they are small enough as to make this a reasonable approxi-
mation.
39The overall percentage of 1.48% is obtained as the product of the emigration rate of highly educated workers (14%) times the
share of highly educated (skilled) workers in the total Eastern European laborforce (about 10.5%).
24We thus set δH =0 .25.40 The value of δP, the (percentage) psychological cost, is empirically inferred from
actual migration rates in cases with unrestricted international mobility. There have been periods in history
with virtually no legal restrictions on labor mobility between some countries but still large wage diﬀerentials.
For instance, Puerto Ricans have had full citizenship rights in the U.S. since 1945 and average wages in Puerto
Rico are around 25% of those in the U.S. Yet we observe in those instances that migration falls short of what
we would expect based on economic considerations. Thus Puerto Rico had an emigration rate during the 1950s
and 1960s of only 0.8% each year and about 35% over thirty years.41 Although these ﬁgures are substantial,
they also indicate that despite the large diﬀerences in per capita income and no legal barriers to migration, the
large majority of people did not migrate—the stock of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. in 2000 was around 33% of the
population of Puerto Rico. Klein and Ventura (2006) calibrate the psychological costs as the costs needed, on
top of human capital costs, to generate an average yearly migration rate equal to 1% per year over 25 years.
They obtain a “utility cost” that, expressed in consumption-equivalent terms, amounts to a loss of between 15
and 20% of the steady state real wage.42 Given that migration rates of 1% per year are among the highest
observed, this range is probably a lower bound for psychological costs and so we use the value of δP =0 .20
as reference. Finally, we do not have empirical estimates for the costs implied by the existing legal barriers
between East and West, DB. However we calibrate these residual legal costs in order to deliver the migration
rates observed in 2000. These legal costs would have to be equal to an additional 26% reduction on the wages
that highly educated migrants would receive in the West. Thus, Column I of Table 4 shows the equilibrium
corresponding to the scenario with such calibrated legal migration costs and trade costs equal to τ =1 .4. Notice
that, given the small migratory ﬂows, the scenario of Column III in the previous Table 3 is similar to the one
of Column I in Table 4: the current situation corresponds to a situation of relatively free trade and highly
constrained labor mobility.
Speciﬁcations II and III of Table 4 analyze the eﬀects of reducing the existing legal barriers to migration
(DB) and show some of the key contributions of our analysis. In particular, speciﬁcation II shows the case
where the costs of legal barriers to migration have been reduced to half of their current value (intermediate
migration costs, equal to 13% of the wage received by migrants to Western Europe) while column III considers
the scenario where most legal restrictions to labor mobility have been removed.43 In both cases we keep the
40Based on Mexican immigrants to the U.S., Borjas (1996) estimates earning losses of around 15%. This smaller percentage is
likely to be aﬀected by the skill composition of migrants. Since a large fraction of them were low skilled and employed mostly in
manual jobs, their loss of ability is likely to be proportionally smaller than that of more educated workers employed in occupations
where language and knowledge of local norms is more important.
41Hatton and Williamson (2005), (2006) report similar migration rates from Italy, Ireland and Poland to the US in the period
1880-1913.
42We thank Gustavo Ventura for making available to us the average psycological cost in utility-equivalent terms implied by the
Klein and Ventura (2006) model applied to the US-Mexico case.
43Examples of the minimum administrative costs that might still remain are the information costs and paperwork needed to
get access to the Social Security, medical and tax systems, among others, in the destination country. We do not claim that these
minimum costs are equal to 17% of the current legal costs–in fact, it’s reasonable to believe they are higher. In terms of wages
this level of migration costs corresponds to 4% of the wage that immigrants receive in the West.
25human capital and psychological costs constant. The scenario with intermediate migration costs is probably the
most realistic, while the scenario with low costs seems a limiting case.
As migration costs are reduced several interesting eﬀects can be observed. First, the increased migration
increases the relative specialization between East and West: for intermediate migration costs (speciﬁcation
II), the East completely specializes in sector Y (see employment shares). Second, the migration-threshold for
Eastern European workers in speciﬁcation II corresponds to workers with completed secondary education.44
That is, with intermediate costs only workers with secondary and tertiary education migrate, which results in
a total migration rate of less than 9% of the Eastern European labor force. In contrast, speciﬁcation III (with
low migration costs) illustrates the case where there is migration at the top (secondary education and above)
and at the bottom (less than primary education) of the schooling distribution. Interestingly, this case produces
a total emigration rate from Eastern Europe around 30%, a value that is in line with the historical long-run
emigration rates from Puerto Rico to the U.S. during the period 1950-2000. Third, despite the increase in the
relative specialization of the regions, the volume of trade (not reported in the Table) decreases as migration
costs are reduced (from the current 9% of total E.U. GDP to 8.5% for intermediate migration costs and then
onto 6.5% for low migration costs). This happens because immigration increases the concentration of production
and demand in the West and decreases demand from the East, resulting in smaller bilateral trade.
The most notable ﬁnding, however, is that in terms of real wages, freer migration is beneﬁcial to each country
overall and to most groups in each country. The price level (ﬁrst row in Table 4) decreases in both regions.45
The highly educated from Eastern Europe are used more eﬃciently in the West and help create a wider range
of varieties of good X.T h e s e e ﬃciency gains from the relocation of labor spill over to the East in the form
of reduced prices of traded goods. As proved theoretically under free trade, the productivity gain of migrants
are large enough to more than oﬀset the increased trade costs incurred by Country 2 to buy the new varieties.
Consequently, there is a real wage gain for the workers remaining in Country 2 from the migration of their co-
nationals. Real income increases for the average native worker in each country. Following Clemens and Pritchett
(2008) we compare income “per natural”, that is, the average income earned by natives of a country, regardless
of where they reside.46 Looking at income per natural, reported in the third row of Table 4, we observe that
it increases by 0.8% in Western Europe and by 38% in Eastern Europe going from speciﬁcation I to III. By
contrast, the comparison of income per capita misses most of this positive eﬀect for two reasons. First, the
increased wages of emigrants from Eastern Europe are not recorded in the income of Eastern Europe. Second,
the migration of highly educated migrants, while helping rather than hurting the income of those who remain,
44Although not reported on the Table, ZTMH
2 equals 0.78, which corresponds to completed secondary education.
45With respect to the current situation, the change in the price level in the West would be equal to -0.6% and -2.1% for
intermediate and low legal costs respectively, while for the East these price reductions would be -0.09% and -1.4%.
46Clemens and Pritchett (2008) argue convincingly that “income per natural” rather than “income per person” should be used
to evaluate the beneﬁcial eﬀects of migration.
26decreases the average education and income of the East, due to a compositional eﬀect. In short, although
international migration beneﬁts almost every group, an analysis based on income per capita at the country level
would show an income loss in each country because of the compositional eﬀects.
As for the eﬀect on real wages by educational group, they are reported in the central rows of Table 4 and
for Eastern nationals, in the case of migration, they are diﬀerentiated between those who stay and those who
migrate. For Western Europe, the move towards freer labor mobility helps the less educated (a 2.1% increase in
the real wages of workers with less than primary education going from speciﬁcation I to III) and hurts slightly
the most educated who are negatively aﬀected by the increased supply of highly educated migrants (about -0.9%
change in the average wages of the college educated). As for workers in Eastern Europe, the highly educated
who migrate gain the most.47 At the same time, all workers who remain in Eastern Europe also obtain real
gains of 1.4% of their current wage relative to the case with no migration.48 This gain stems entirely from the
lower prices and the larger variety of goods that those workers enjoy via trade.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of international migration that combines technological diﬀerences across countries,
t r a d eo fad i ﬀerentiated good and heterogeneous workers. This ﬁlls a gap in the literature. Trade and migration
tend to be analyzed separately and, to our knowledge, no model exists that analyzes the patterns of (and gains
from) trade and migration in a setup combining technological diﬀerences and diﬀerences in factor endowments
(workers’ skills). The model produces interesting qualitative predictions about the patterns of migration, pro-
ductive specialization and wages when labor mobility (in addition to trade) is allowed. We apply the model
to an important case of economic integration: East-West European economic integration. Calibrated to match
the main economic features of Eastern and Western Europe, we simulate the comparison (comparative statics)
between the case of no economic interactions (the pre-1990 situation) and almost free trade (as of year 2004).
We then use the model to predict the (long-run) eﬀects of reducing the legal costs of migration between the two
regions.
Our simulations show that if the legal costs of migration between East and West were reduced by half,
about 9% of the Eastern European population of working age would eventually move to the West, and those
migrants would be selected among highly educated workers. This would beneﬁt Europe as a whole by increasing
47Table 4 report the real wages received by the migrants but not the consumption-equivalent wages. In order to translate the
real wages received into utility or consumption-equivalents one needs to substract the psychological costs (estimated at 20% of the
wage).
48It is important to notice that, due to the migration of some workers within the group, the average real wages by educational
group in Eastern Europe reported in speciﬁcations I through III in Table 4 are not basedo nt h es a m ew o r k e r s ’skill distribution,
and thus cannot be directly compared. When we consider workers of comparable skills, the diﬀerence in the real wages of Eastern
Europe between speciﬁcations I and III across all educational groups amounts to 1.4%, equal to the diﬀerence in the price level
between both speciﬁcations.
27t h ei n c o m ep e rn a t u r a lo fW e s t e r nE u r o p eby 0.3% and that of Eastern Europe by 9.5%. Most of these beneﬁts
accrue to the highly educated workers who migrate. However, trade spreads the beneﬁt si nt h ef o r mo fm o r e
and cheaper varieties of goods and services also available to workers in Eastern Europe. The least educated
workers in the East, as well as those in the West, would gain from migration (between 0.1 and 0.6% of their
wage). The only group that would somehow suﬀer from these migration patterns would be the highly educated
in the West who would experience a relatively small real wage loss (-0.18%).
28A Details of Proofs of Propositions 1 to 4
We use the implicit function theorem applied to the equilibrium condition (14) to derive the dependence of Zj



















Applying Leibniz’s rule to diﬀerentiate =[Zj,g Y ,g Xj,β,σ,θ,M j,F Xj,G j(Z)] as deﬁned in (14) with respect
to Zj, if gXj >g Yj and σ>θit is easy to verify that the derivative ∂=/∂Zj is the sum of three positive terms
and hence is positive.
D e t a i l so ft h eP r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 : It is easy to verify that ∂=/∂Mj > 0. Thus, for the implicit function
theorem ∂Zj/∂Mj = −(=/∂Zj/∂=/∂Mj) < 0, so that an increase in Mj decreases Zj. From equation (20) a
decrease in Zj implies that the left hand side of the equation decreases while CX and the integral on the right
hand side increase. This implies that PX must decrease in order to maintain the equality. Therefore, the share












Xj +( 1− β)θ
i
, increases as long as
θ>1. The results described in the proposition are easily derived from the increase in CX and s(PX)a n dt h e
decrease in PX.
Details of the Proof of Proposition 2: It is easy to verify that ∂=/∂Λj > 0. Thus, for the implicit function
theorem ∂Zj/∂Λj = −(=/∂Zj/∂=/∂Λj) < 0, so that an increase in Λj decreases Zj.A s i n t h e c a s e o f
proposition 1, this must imply a decrease in PX. In this case not only do real wages in sector X increase due to
an increase in CX and a decrease in P, but also due to the increase in Λj (see expression (8)). Similarly, real
wages in sector Y increase due to a decrease in P a n da ni n c r e a s ei nΛj.
Details of the Proof of Proposition 3: For θ = 1 it is easy to prove that ∂=/∂gX < 0s ot h a t∂Zj∂gX > 0.
Intuitively, an increase in gX has two eﬀects on the second term of expression (14): it decreases the term
1












. The ﬁrst eﬀect is smaller for θ =1 , as it is calculated
at Zj while the eﬀect on the integral is calculated at all values between Zj and 1. Hence the second eﬀect prevails,
and with the negative sign in front this implies ∂=/∂gX < 0. This is still true as long as θ is not too large, but
for high θ the eﬀect is reversed. In the new equilibrium with higher gX and higher Zj, considering each term
in (14), the ﬁrst integral term certainly increases and CX decreases, so the second integral must have increased
to preserve the equality. If
1 Z
Zj
exp(gXjZ)dGj(Z) increases in the new equilibrium, then the number of varieties,
NX, must increase (as per expression 12) and the price index PX must decrease (see expression 11) due to the
increase in NX and the decrease in CX. The other implications follow easily from these two results.
29Details of the Proof of Proposition 4: Consider a shift in the density dGj(Z) which shifts workers from skills
below or at Zj to skills above Zj. This implies a decrease in the term
Zj Z
0




exp(gXjZ)dGj(Z). Hence the overall value of =[Zj,g Y ,g Xj,β,σ,θ,M j,F Xj,G j(Z)] would decrease
so that ∂=/∂Gj(Z)<0 and for the implicit function theorem ∂Zj/∂Gj(Z)=−(=/∂Zj/∂=/∂Gj(Z)) > 0. As
for proposition 3, this implies a decrease in CX and a decrease in PX and therefore a decrease in P. The other
results follow from these.
B Equilibrium Conditions with (Costly) Trade
The equilibrium number of ﬁrms and varieties in country j in the presence of trade is given by an expression































i,j =1 ,2 i 6= j
(21)
As explained, the cut-oﬀ skill levels Z
T
j ,j =1 ,2, are pinned down by the world market clearing conditions
for good Y, for the varieties of good X produced in Country 1 and those produced in Country 2. Once we
incorporate the trade-balance conditions (E1 = M1W1,E 2 = M2W2) and the expression for the number of
varieties (12) these can be written as follows:












































=( σ − 1)FX2p2
Proof of the Corollary to Proposition 5: Consider equilibrium equation (17). For given relative ﬁxed costs
FX1
FX2, an increase in the ratio
(gX1−gY 1)




2 . This in turn implies that in
Country 1 more workers move into sector X (lower Z
T
1 ) and thus Country 1 becomes relatively more specialized
in that sector while Country 2 becomes relatively more specialized in sector Y (Z
T
2 increases). Notice also that
given that gX2 >g Y 2 and FX1
FX2 > 1( ar e s t r i c t i o na s s u m e di ns e c t i o n3t or e ﬂect that more advanced technologies
require higher ﬁxed costs), there can be no equilibrium in which Country 1 completely specializes in sector X
30(i.e., Z
T
1 = 0) under free trade. However, there can be equilibria in which Country 2 fully specializes in sector Y
(Z
T




C Equilibrium Conditions with (Costly) Trade and Migration




2 (given by conditions similar to 19), the other relevant skill
levels are the thresholds determining the assignment of workers between sectors X and Y in Countries 1 and




2 respectively. The inter-sectoral cut-oﬀs are pinned down by the market-clearing
conditions for goods Y, for the varieties of good X produced in Country 1 and those produced in Country 2,
whose expressions are now as follows:
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31Notice that the main diﬀerence with respect to the scenario with trade and no migration is that now the output
in sectors Y and X in Country 1 might be produced by migrants from Country 2, and migration costs dissipate
part of the potential output of those workers.








2 , we can compute the number of



















































i,j =1 ,2 i 6= j (26)
Two ﬁnal remarks are in order. If migration costs are too high, the lower migration threshold Z
TML
2 will
be 0 and condition (19) will be satisﬁed for a relatively high value of Z
TMH
2 . On the other hand, if migration
costs are very low (but not so low as to have all workers migrate) Country 2 would lose most of its highly skilled
workers with the possible consequence of also losing its advanced sector X. In this case the above equilibrium
conditions would still be valid if one replaces Z
TM
2 (the inter-sectoral skill threshold) with Z
TMH
2 (the migration
threshold for high-skilled workers).
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1 
Logarithmic Wage Schedule in Autarky:  



























Increase in return to skills, gX and  average schooling
increase in slope  gX





Notes: The horizontal axis measures the skill (schooling) level of workers, standardized to be between 0 and 1. The 
vertical axis measures the natural logarithm of the wage in terms of the numeraire good Y.   37  
Figure 2 
Logarithmic Real Wage Schedules in Autarky: 
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Notes: The horizontal axis measures the skill (schooling) level of workers, standardized to be between 0 and 1. The 
vertical axis measures the natural logarithm of the wage in real (representative basket) units.   38  
Figure 3 
Incentives to Migrate: 
Comparison between logarithmic real wages in Country 2 and logarithmic 













Country 2 real wage schedule
Skills 1
Country 1 real wage schedule, net 
of migration costs;
prohibitive costs
Country 1 real wage schedule, net 
of migration costs; 
high costs
Country 1 real wage schedule, net 




Notes: The migration costs δ are assumed to be proportional to wages. The vertical distance between the 
two lines measures the gains from migrating from Country 2 to Country 1 for workers of skill level Z. This 
gain is positive if the thicker black line lies above the grey line, and is negative (a loss) if the grey line lies 
above the black one. The lowest black schedule is drawn for prohibitive migration costs, the intermediate 
one for high migration costs and the highest one for low migration costs.  39  
        Figure 4 
From Autarky to Free Trade: 


































from Y to X
Change sector
from X to Y
 
Notes: The horizontal axis measures the skill (schooling) level of workers, standardized to be between 0 
and 1. The vertical axis measures the natural logarithm of the real wage.  The segment denoted as “Change 
sector” represents the range of skills of workers who switch sectors when going from autarky to free trade. 
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Figure 5 
Trade Costs and Relative Specialization:  




















































Share of workers in X, Country 1




Notes: The simulation represents the share of employment of Country 1 in sector X (in black) and the share of 
employment of Country 2 in sector X (in grey) for increasing trade costs, τ. The parameter values used in the 
simulations reproduce the comparative advantage and the employment size of the baseline case in the East-
West European simulation, namely those reported in Table 2. 
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Figure 6 
From Free Trade to Trade and Migration: 
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Workers in this range  





Notes: The horizontal axis measures the skill (schooling) level of workers, standardized to be between 0 












Notes: Emigration rates are calculated as the total number of people residing out of the country of origin relative to the working age 
population in the country of origin by level of education and in the aggregate.  Low levels of education include people with 0 to 8 years of 
schooling, Intermediate levels of education include people with 9 to 12 years of schooling. High levels of education include people with 
13 years of schooling or more. “Eastern Europe” only includes the Eastern European countries admitted to the EU in 2004 and 2006.  




























China  0.1%  0.1%  3.8% 0.2% 0.0%  0.0%  0.8% 0.1% 
India  0.1%  0.4%  4.3% 0.4% 0.0%  0.1%  1.5% 0.1% 
Philippines  1.4%  3.3%  13.7%  5.0% 0.1%  0.3%  0.8% 0.8% 
Romania  4.6%  2.0%  11.8%  3.7% 1.1%  1.1%  2.7% 1.3% 
Eastern  Europe  5.0%  3.3%  14% 5.2% 0.5%  1.2%  0.8% 1.1%  43  
 
TABLE 2: PARAMETER VALUES 
 








Population and Education    
Mj: Total population (Western EU’s, standardized 
to 1) 
1 0.3 
Share of population with less than primary 
education 
0.13 0.06 
Share of population with primary education  0.47  0.66 
Share of population with secondary education  0.32  0.22 
Share of population with a college degree or more  0.08  0.06 
Technology    
Λj: TFP level (Country 2’s is standardized to 1)  2 1 
gXj: Returns to skills (schooling) in sector X  2  1 
gYj: Returns to skills (schooling) in sector Y  0.4  0.5 
Fxj: Fixed cost of development of a variety in X  50  3.5 
  
Common to both countries 
Preferences   
θ: elasticity of substitution between goods X and Y 1.5 
β: preference for good X in the utility function  0.5 
 σ: elasticity of substitution between varieties of X  4 
Notes: The choice of parameters is described in detail in the main text. Parameters 
related to population  and education are obtained from the data, parameters related 
to technology are either from the literature  or calibrated to match the features of 
Eastern and Western Europe, and the taste parameters, common to the two 






TABLE 3: TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND BARRIERS TO MIGRATION 
   
Autarky 
(I) 
Free Trade and No 
Migration 
(II) 
Costly Trade (τ=1.4) 
and No Migration 
(III) 












Overall price  1  1.341  0.992  0.992  1.004  1.139 
Real income per capita   1  0.369  1.019  0.496  1.014  0.426 
Real wages of workers with educational level: 
- Less than primary (natives)  0.795  0.302  0.801  0.409  0.792  0.356 
- Primary (natives)  0.895  0.351  0.903  0.475  0.892  0.413 
-  Secondary  (natives)  1.086 0.408 1.118 0.538 1.121  0.457 
- College degree or more 
(natives) 
1.613 0.499 1.665 0.655 1.672  0.517 
Employment share in sector Y  66%  72%  64%  81%  62%  96% 
Employment share in sector X  34%  28%  36%  19%  38%  4% 
Total Trade / Total GDP   0  9.9%  8.9% 
% Trade in differentiated 
goods 
0 78.4%  53.9% 
Notes: The income and wages of both countries in all scenarios have been standardized to the per capita income of 
country 1 in autarky. Similarly, the prices have been standardized to country 1’s price under autarky.  Specification 
(I) shows the Autarky equilibrium with no trade and no labor mobility between countries. Specification (II) shows 
the case of free trade and no migration. Specification (III) shows the case with no migration and trade costs 
calibrated to match the volume of trade between Eastern and Western Europe observed in 2004.  45  
 TABLE 4: DECREASING BARRIERS TO MIGRATION WITH COSTLY TRADE, τ=1.4 
   
High (current) Migration 
Costs 
 (I) 
Intermediate Migration  
Costs 
(50% of current legal costs) 
(II) 
Low Migration  
Costs  
(17% of current legal costs) 
 (III) 
  Western EU  Eastern EU Western EU  Eastern EU Western EU  Eastern EU 
Overall  price  1.003 1.141 0.997 1.140 0.982 1.125 
Real income per capita   1.014  0.423  1.015  0.417  1.005  0.419 
Real income “per natural”  1.014  0.431  1.017  0.472  1.022  0.596 
Real wages of workers with educational level: 
  - Less than primary (natives)  0.792  0.355  0.797  0.356  0.809  0.392 
  - Less than primary (migrants)            0.515 
  - Primary (natives)  0.893  0.412  0.898  0.413  0.912  0.418 
  - Primary (migrants)             
  - Secondary (natives)  1.122 0.456 1.120 0.454 1.115 0.443 
  - Secondary (migrants)        0.756    0.776 
  - College degree or more (natives)  1.672  0.504  1.669    1.658   
  - College degree or more 
(migrants)    0.977  1.013  1.159 
Employment share in sector Y   62%  97%  61%  100%  61%  100% 
Employment share in sector X   38%  3%  39%  0%  39%  0% 
Migration rate, of which  0.44%  1.48%  2.63%  8.76%  8.93%  29.77% 
  % Less educated (primary or less)  0  0  0  0  18.1%  18.1% 
  % Highly educated (secondary or 
more) 
100% 100% 100% 100% 89.9% 89.9% 
Notes: The income and wages of both countries in all scenarios have been standardized to the per capita income of country 1 in 
autarky. Similarly, the prices have been standardized to country 1’s price under autarky. The wages of migrants reported in the 
table are net of migration costs due to human capital losses and legal barriers to migrations but do not reflect the psychological 
costs of migrating. In order to translate these wages into consumption-equivalent terms one needs to substract the psychological 
costs estimated at 20%. 
The legal migration costs used in specification (I) are those costs that yield the observed current migration rate from Eastern 
Europe with trade costs τ=1.4. They are equal to 26% of the wage received by the average migrant in Western European Worker. 
In specification (II) those legal costs are cut to 13% of migrant-wages in Western Europe and in specification (III) they are 
reduced to 4% of those wages. 